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  1 
Introduction 
 
1. In June 2011, the Minister of State for Energy asked the Radioactive Waste 
Management Directorate (RWMD), part of the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA), to conduct a review of the implementation plan for the geological 
disposal facility (GDF) with the ambition of seeing first waste emplacement being 
brought forward from 2040 to 2029, with consequent possibilities for acceleration 
of subsequent emplacements of high-level waste (HLW) and spent fuels. 
 
2. In January 2012, the Royal Academy of Engineering was approached by the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to provide a review of the 
NDA options published in December 2011. The Academy, with DECC, agreed an 
approach whereby a review panel of senior engineers with relevant expertise 
would be formed and would review the options for acceleration from an 
engineering perspective. Members of the review panel were: 
 
Sir John Armitt CBE FREng (Chair) 
Norman Haste OBE FREng 
Dr Dame Sue Ion DBE FREng 
Professor Hywel Thomas FREng 
Professor Paul Younger FREng 
 
Secretarial support was provided by Richard Ploszek, Senior Policy Advisor 
at the Royal Academy of Engineering. 
 
3. In addition to wide-ranging discussion among the panel members of the issues 
raised within the options, a joint meeting was held between the panel, DECC and 
NDA officials and arrangements were made for any queries from the panel to be 
fielded by experts within NDA and DECC. 
 
4. In conducting this review, the review panel has necessarily been limited to the 
assessment of the engineering implications (risks and opportunities) of the three 
scenarios which incorporate a number of specific options and the rigour of the 
conclusions. In terms of the engineering of the GDF, the panel was of the opinion 
that planning considerations (as opposed to engineering programme 
considerations), the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 
proposed voluntarism process (adopted by government) and local community 
engagement were all part of the engineering delivery of the entire project. The 
deliverability of the scenarios and the options within them was considered in 
terms of the normal engineering and project management risks they presented, 
but the political risks of announcing firm delivery dates ahead of the start of such 
a major and long-duration engineering project are not assessed in this review. 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
5. The full terms of reference are included in Annex A. The key elements of the 
Academy review can be summarised as follows. 
 
The peer review should assess the work carried out to date by the NDA on 
options for accelerating the programme, in particular on options for bringing 
forward first waste emplacement in a geological disposal facility from 2040 to 
2029. It should include views on the robustness of the process the NDA has 
followed in developing and assessing a long list of options, evaluate the risks 
and opportunities identified and consider the analysis and conclusions 
presented in the report. 
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6. As such, this review was concerned with the potential for accelerating the 
creation of the repository but not with the technical issues/opportunities of 
encapsulation of the different types of waste. 
 
7. The review panel did not examine detailed information on the process the NDA 
followed in developing the long list of options, but has been able to consider the 
robustness of the output. In this context, the treatment of engineering risks 
associated with acceleration (announcement of earlier completion dates ahead of 
project initiation and final project specification) in the options can be assessed 
and are indicative of the robustness of the processes used to determine them. 
 
General findings 
 
8. The panel accepted that there are clear and agreed processes within the overall 
process of 'voluntarism' that, in light of the history of GDF development should 
not be ignored, avoided or rushed. There are expectations of how long 
community engagement could take but that it is, by definition, it is an open-ended 
process. The process of voluntarism was proposed by CoRWM and has been 
adopted by government. To create a repository, a fundamental criterion is 
community acceptance. This acceptance has been a key factor in other countries 
which are ahead of the UK in developing GDFs, such as Sweden and Finland. It 
could well be helpful for the local volunteer communities in the UK to share 
experiences with the communities which are more advanced in other countries, 
albeit communities and projects may be potentially different and the review panel 
understands that funding for some such visits has been, and continues to be, 
available. Exchange visits might be a valuable endeavour in this regard. This 
could help build confidence and enable UK communities to come to decisions 
more quickly and with more information available to them. 
 
9. The review panel noted that there is clearly a determination within the NDA to 
avoid the problems experienced by Nirex, but at the same time Nirex should not 
be allowed to create a shadow of concern over the NDA. The NDA should be 
frank and open about the Nirex issues with stakeholders, and use this candour to 
create an air of confidence in the NDA approach. 
 
10. Early delivery of a GDF on a set date relies critically on the programme starting 
on time. Early progress clearly depends on the communities already in the 
process being prepared to take decisions about proceeding to the next stage. 
There is considerable preparation to be done prior to engineering works 
beginning and an early priority should be to ensure that, during the remainder of 
2012, every opportunity is taken to encourage acceptance by the stakeholders for 
investigation to proceed to the next stage. If there is a realistic possibility of 
further communities making an expression of interest, these options should also 
be pursued as efficiently as possible. The NDA should have a focused approach 
to all possible risks and advantages which can be managed in this period. 
 
11. In the opinion of the review panel, options for acceleration of the programme are 
warranted on a number of grounds: 
 
a) Work to reduce timescales in the baseline programme will, in the absence of 
a decision to bring forward emplacement of waste, create more scope for 
flexibility in the programme and significantly increase the probability of 
delivery of the project to time and to budget. In terms of government 
definitions, every effort should be made in the optimisation of the programme 
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regardless of decisions over acceleration (announcing earlier dates for first 
emplacement). 
b) Speeding up of the critical phases of the programme create the option of 
allowing volunteer communities to take decisions ahead of schedule, and/or 
to do so with more confidence and on the basis of a better information base. 
c) Although acceleration (of the programme) can introduce some construction 
risks where progression is made without all of the information that could 
possibly be available, the acceleration itself can be planned to allow time for 
engineering solutions to be sought. It is in any case impossible to completely 
and infallibly characterise the rock mass at proposed gallery depth, and 
issues concerning unanticipated permeable fractures and the like will have to 
be managed by engineering interventions (such as high-pressure grouting). 
Hence, the additional risk of proceeding with some elements of the GDF 
programme earlier than the baseline case is not large. 
 
12. The review panel concluded that the risks arising from acceleration of the 
programme break down into four categories: 
 
a) Financial risks: those that involve extra expenditure but do not necessarily 
affect programme timing. 
b) Regulatory risks: those that involve new safety cases to be made that will 
require regulatory oversight with consequent risk of rejection or delay. 
c) Programme risks: where unforeseen circumstances produce knock-on delays 
in the programme risking late delivery. 
d) Skills and resources risks: where particular skilled workers or regulators are 
not available in the numbers required at critical points in the programme. This 
also applies to critical resources, such as specialised pieces of equipment 
and/or materials. 
 
Site identification 
 
13. It was clear to the review panel that there will never be an absolutely 'perfect site' 
from a geological/hydrogeological perspective; however, the panel holds the view 
that engineering solutions are available to ensure creation of a 'fit for purpose' 
GDF at the finally chosen site (above and below ground) within the range of 
feasible (hydro)geological conditions. The NDA’s proposed options for 
acceleration will have little or no effect on the eventually chosen site, and 
contingencies to deal with variations in exact site conditions need to be 
maintained independently of decisions on acceleration of the announced 
programme dates. 
 
14. It was also clear to the review panel that while the engineering and timing of 
scenarios one and two were feasible (see paragraph 33 for the panel's views on 
the borehole technologies used in option three), specific site conditions would 
have an impact on the ability of the project team to deliver the project on time and 
to budget. Some, but not all, of the implications presented by specific sites will be 
discoverable before a specific site is chosen, so there is little advantage in putting 
off decisions to rebaseline the programme until a preferred site is positively 
identified. As added insurance that an accelerated programme could be 
delivered, it was the view of the panel that other volunteer communities should 
continue to be sought around the UK (accepting current political sensitivities 
surrounding engagement with Scottish communities) so as to provide the widest 
possible choice of sites. 
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15. While accepting that community decision timeframes might not be brought 
forward, the panel concluded that there is merit in proceeding with stage four (site 
identification and assessment) as efficiently as possible. If the baseline 
programme allows five years for completion of site identification and assessment, 
there is no engineering reason why this could not be accelerated, using available 
geological survey data (and data from work previously conducted in the Cumbria 
region and other Nirex investigations if appropriate), and creating the option of an 
earlier community decision based on all available information. 
 
16. The five-year horizon for stage four is not dictated by engineering requirements. 
 
17. Depending on environmental permits and planning permissions, some 
geophysical investigations which do not cause significant impact could be 
brought forward into stage four if site identification can be accelerated. Although 
there may be a desire not to commit money and resources to geophysical 
investigations until after community decisions have been made, if community 
agreement can be achieved to allow this work to come forward without 
prejudicing community commitment to the next stage, it makes sense to do so 
and carries only a small downside risk of some investigation work and expense 
being wasted. 
 
Site investigation 
 
18. The panel considered that there were no major geological or hydrogeological 
risks over and above the baseline case in the three scenarios put forward by the 
NDA. In engineering terms (excluding regulatory and planning risks), all options 
within the three scenarios concerning site investigation are credible and robust. 
 
19. Within stage five, the review panel considered that it would be sensible to 
proceed with exploratory boreholes in parallel with further geophysical 
investigations. The view of the panel was that for a less sensitive project, the first 
few boreholes would be sunk on a 'best guess' basis in order to obtain as much 
information on rock characterisation as quickly as possible. Bearing in mind that 
environmental and planning concerns may lead to the absolutely optimal 
borehole sites not being made available, the additional risk of using an element of 
‘best guess’ based on a partial dataset of geophysical information does not 
increase programme risk as much as might be initially thought. This approach 
should be considered. A ‘best guess’ approach to early borehole sighting would 
naturally be to place boreholes where they have the least possibility of interfering 
with a ‘best guess’ vault layout to reduce the risk rendering a suitable rock 
volume unusable. As even a meticulously planned exploratory borehole 
programme cannot fully characterise the rock volume at depth, the review panel 
considered there was also a residual risk of planned boreholes rendering rock 
volumes unusable that later turn out to have been optimal, so the additional risk a 
‘best guess’ approach for early boreholes was not as large as might otherwise be 
expected. 
 
20. Sinking of early boreholes ahead of full geophysical information carries a risk of 
potentially requiring a small number of extra boreholes to be sunk. This does not 
pose a programme risk as the time required to drill to a 650m depth in hard rock 
is only of the order of a month or so. Of more concern might be the ongoing 
availability of rigs and skilled drilling operatives in a constrained market with 
many other calls on the drilling operators' time. 
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Construction phase 
 
21. The review panel was of the view that the timelines expressed in the baseline 
case were very conservative (with significantly more time devoted to the decision-
making processes than might be expected in a purely commercial project) and 
that, with good project management techniques, there was scope to optimise the 
programme in its current form, without adopting new scenarios. It was felt that the 
currently accepted timelines were not dictated by engineering requirements 
alone. 
 
22. The methods of achieving acceleration in scenarios one and two are all 
technically feasible, in terms of the engineering involved, with little downside risk. 
 
23. The acceleration proposals in scenario three are technically feasible with the 
exception of the deep borehole approach in scenario three will require 
considerable further research and development, and by its very nature carries 
construction risks which inevitably make it a higher-risk option compared to the 
underground tunnelling approaches. This is because in such deep boreholes the 
likelihood of wall instability damaging casing and causing access problems is 
rather unpredictable. The benefits could, however, be considerable and 
continued research and development, possibly with other countries is 
recommended. The panel understands that there is still interest in deep borehole 
disposal in the USA, driven by the possibility that a centralised GDF may not be 
politically achievable, leaving individual states to find their own GDF solutions. 
 
24. Shallow-level repositories only carry a consents risk, not a practical risk. In 
Belgium, consents have been granted. Given the nature of the geology in 
potential sites the risk of subsequent investigations resulting in the need for a 
second site away from the initial shallow repository is low and unlikely to be 
advanced as a reason not to commence work on a high-level waste repository at 
greater depth. Equally bringing forward the opportunity to create a HLW facility in 
parallel with SILW and LLW is not a high risk approach. 
 
25. Acceleration will put pressure on the regulatory bodies and it will be necessary to 
recognise this challenge at an early date and take steps to ensure resource 
levels in these bodies do not become a constraint. Because of current 
demographic profiles and general pressures on numbers (in staff terms), there is 
a real danger of regulatory bodies losing experienced staff through retirement 
and struggling to recruit new staff with commensurate experience and 
knowledge. The Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has recognised that its past 
demographic presented a problem with its long-term ability to fulfil its regulatory 
duties and has been working to address this. 
 
Scenario one 
 
26. The review panel agreed with the NDA analysis that the site characterisation 
programme could be accelerated by bringing the sinking of exploratory boreholes 
forward to occur in parallel with geophysical investigations. In the opinion of the 
review panel, it would be unlikely that ‘optimal’ borehole sites could be identified 
with significantly more certainty should the borehole investigation be carried out 
in series with geophysical investigations, so an element of ‘best guess’ 
judgement in the siting of boreholes introduces little additional risk. The panel 
considered that, although the small risk of requiring the sinking of additional 
exploratory boreholes exists, the possibility of this, if acknowledged early in the 
environmental permissioning process, should not present significant risk 
  6 
(assuming a ‘programme’ of borehole investigations is sought rather than 
permissioning individual boreholes). The panel warned that even the most 
comprehensive programme of borehole investigations cannot entirely 
characterise the rock formation of interest at depth, only reduce uncertainties. It is 
entirely possible that the actual conditions discovered at depth vary from the 
picture presented by borehole investigations but the amount of information 
obtained (as opposed to data) from sinking additional boreholes hits the law of 
diminishing returns quickly.  
 
27. The further acceleration of the borehole investigations by commencing 
geophysical investigations towards the end of stage four rather than stage five 
also seemed to make sense in terms of the engineering programme. The panel 
concluded that the availability of more and better information earlier in the 
programme would be seen as a benefit to community engagement. 
 
28. Acceleration options for emplacement of HLW and AGR spent fuel in scenario 
one do not significantly impact on the acceleration of the date, from 2040 to 2036, 
for first emplacement of shielded ILW. However, revisions to the baseline 
programme that can reduce handling and movement requirements for these 
wastes should be pursued regardless of acceleration of first emplacement 
considerations. 
 
Scenario two 
 
29. The main element of change to the baseline case in scenario two allowing the 
bringing forward of first emplacement of ILW to 2029 appears to be the splitting of 
permissioning and disposal of certain types of HLW and ILW, with some changes 
to the handling, packing and storage of certain waste types. 
 
30. Although thought by the review panel to be technically feasible, the use of a 
shallow-level vault for shielded ILW and LLW is potentially a side issue in terms 
of delivering an earlier date for first emplacement of waste. The important point is 
that it is an entirely separate vault regardless of depth. The panel was aware of 
work in Belgium to go forward with a GDF design incorporating a shallower vault 
for emplacement of SILW and LLW, so concluded that this option presented 
insignificant additional technical risk and low additional regulatory risk with 
significant learning available from the Belgian experience. 
 
31. Wrapped up with the splitting of permissioning and emplacement of the different 
categories of waste are significant changes to the emplacement of HLW without a 
disposal overpack, relying, in the safety case, on the existing stainless steel 
canister and vitrification. These options, if acceptable, significantly bring forward 
the possible emplacement of HLW, but have no impact, in themselves, on the 
date for first emplacement of SILW and LLW. The review panel considered that 
these options were interesting, but, with the limited time available for the review, 
made it difficult to assess the acceleration potential of the stages approach to site 
characterisation in isolation. It may be that the staged characterisation option can 
be de-risked in regulatory terms without changes to the emplacement of higher 
level wastes. 
 
32. By splitting and staging the site characterisation and permissioning arrangements 
for the two vaults, there is a risk of receiving clearance for the SILW/LLW vault, 
but not the higher-level wastes vault. The review panel considered this to be risk 
that needed to be considered, but concluded that the site investigation and 
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exploratory boreholes processes were likely to flag up the majority of possible 
issues which might lead to this situation well in advance of construction starting.  
 
Scenario three 
 
33. The review panel agreed that the potential use of deep borehole disposal of 
higher-level wastes could reduce the overall footprint of the GDF quite 
considerably and that there is international interest in continuing development of 
this option as an alternative to mined geological disposal. Although the 
technology of deep boreholes is advancing rapidly, with R&D being driven by the 
oil and gas industry, the current state of technology would not make this an 
attractive option today. The risks of wall instability in any particular borehole are 
too large to meet strict safety case requirements at this time. 
 
34. As the main drive for an accelerated programme appears to be to bring the date 
for first emplacement of waste forward from 2040 to 2029 and the deep borehole 
option affects only higher level wastes to be emplaced later, this scenario does 
not seem to warrant further investigation at this time. 
 
Conclusions 
 
35. In terms of the engineering required, the Academy panel believed that all three 
acceleration scenarios could be built in the timescales proposed. However, 
although technically feasible as an engineering concept, the panel does not 
believe that the deep borehole option in scenario three should be pursued without 
further significant research and development of the concept. It currently presents 
the highest engineering risk of technical failure as well as very significant risk of 
failing safety case and regulatory tests. It also brings into question the 
retrievability of deposited waste and should not go forward at this stage as a 
credible option. In engineering terms, both scenarios one and two could be taken 
to the next stage of detailed analysis. 
 
36. The review panel concluded that scenario one carried the lowest safety case and 
regulatory risk. In terms of examining the options presented within the scenarios, 
there could be room for reducing safety case and regulatory risks in scenario two. 
In particular, elements of splitting of permissioning for separate high- and 
intermediate-level waste vaults included in scenario two could be worth further 
examination in isolation of options to change the handling, encapsulation and 
emplacement of higher-level wastes. 
 
37. The five-year horizon for stage four is not dictated by engineering requirements. 
 
38. Successful delivery of an accelerated programme will require a highly finessed 
programme management approach which convinces communities by its 
professionalism, transparency and willingness to listen to community concerns. 
Strong leadership for such a complex programme will create confidence in 
government and in the community and need not take a dictatorial approach with 
community stakeholders. 
 
39. Every aspect of this programme must be manned by the highest quality 
personnel, be they managers, geoscientists, engineers, communicators, 
psychologists, political analysts or lobbyists. All have a part to play but not in too 
forceful a manner which might be perceived as arrogant. It is also important not 
to give the impression that acceleration is driven simply by cost-cutting or 
programme management preferences. This does not mean that the programme 
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management team should not be using a clear milestone-driven approach with 
mutual success reflected in a series of short-term, six-month targets. 
 
40. In summary this is a management challenge; the technology is proven and 
learning can be taken from other countries which are ahead with their 
programmes. In this respect it is likely that potential host communities will 
continue to benefit from exchanging ideas and experiences with host 
communities in other countries, and continued facilitation of such visits is 
recommended. 
 
41. Throughout, consistent clear senior level political support, ideally on a cross party 
basis, will be essential. At this stage the various construction projections are such 
as to not cause cost differences that affect a decision to go for acceleration. 
Terms of course such as 'acceleration' may be emotive and advancing delivery to 
create early solid and economic benefits may be better. 
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Annex A - Terms of Reference 
 
Peer review of Geological Disposal: Review of options for accelerating 
implementation of the geological disposal programme. 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
1. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is seeking 
independent peer review of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's report, 
Geological Disposal: Review of options for accelerating implementation of the 
geological disposal programme, published in December 2011.  
2. The peer review should assess the work carried out to date by the NDA on 
options for accelerating the programme, in particular on options for bringing 
forward first waste emplacement in a geological disposal facility from 2040 to 
2029.  It should include views on the robustness of the process the NDA have 
followed in developing and assessing a long list of options, evaluate the risks 
and opportunities identified and consider the analysis and conclusions 
presented in the report. 
3. The results of the peer review process should be presented to the department 
by 22 March 2012. 
 
Production of the Report 
 
1. The Royal Academy of Engineering will be required to submit a single written 
report to Government presenting the views and conclusions of the Panel by 
22 March 2012. 
2. In support of the production of the Report, DECC and NDA will provide the 
Academy with relevant background briefing material and further information, 
as requested by the Panel. 
3. It is anticipated that the Panel will convene a meeting to discuss and agree its 
conclusions. 
4. During the course of the Panel's work it may be helpful for panel members to 
put questions to the NDA in the run-up to the meeting and such dialogue 
should be facilitated by the Academy, as required. 
5. The Academy should also ensure that the NDA is invited to the panel meeting 
to take questions and provide supplementary information, as necessary. 
6. Copies of the final draft report will be submitted to DECC and NDA in 
advance for checking for factual accuracy. 
 
Role of the Chair 
 
1. The chair of the Panel will be responsible for ensuring throughout the review 
process that the panel understands and agrees how their discussions will be 
presented in the final report. 
2. The chair will be co-responsible with the Academy for ensuring that the 
review keeps to the Terms of Reference for the peer review. 
 
Use of the Report 
 
1. The report will be submitted to Ministers in line with their request for a peer 
review of the NDA's report.  
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Confidentiality 
 
1. DECC requires that the Academy maintains confidentiality about the 
proceedings of the panel until the peer review is published and maintains 
confidentiality about proceedings not captured in the published report; and 
that the Academy direct the panel members to likewise maintain 
confidentiality. 
 
Department of Energy and Climate Change 
February 2012 
